Jonhnathan
817b97f428
* Initial commit * Update Investigation guides - security-docs review * Update command_and_control_dns_tunneling_nslookup.toml * Update defense_evasion_amsienable_key_mod.toml * Apply security-docs review * Remove dot * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_rdp_tunnel_plink.toml Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com> * Apply changes from review * Apply the suggestion Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>
86 lines
3.6 KiB
TOML
86 lines
3.6 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/12/03"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/05/09"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This rule identifies a high number (10) of process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same host within a
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short time period.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations
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Attackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated
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with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted,
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or stop security and backup solutions, etc.
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This rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same
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host within a short time period.
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#### Possible investigation steps
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- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for
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prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
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- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
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- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
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- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
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- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.
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### False positive analysis
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- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
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### Response and remediation
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- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
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- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.
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- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are
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identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business
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systems, and web services.
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- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.
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- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look
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for ransomware preparation and execution activities.
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- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and
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malware components.
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- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
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- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the
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mean time to respond (MTTR).
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"""
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "035889c4-2686-4583-a7df-67f89c292f2c"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Impact"]
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type = "threshold"
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query = '''
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event.category:process and event.type:start and process.name:(net.exe or sc.exe or taskkill.exe) and
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process.args:(stop or pause or delete or "/PID" or "/IM" or "/T" or "/F" or "/t" or "/f" or "/im" or "/pid")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1489"
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name = "Service Stop"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0040"
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name = "Impact"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
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[rule.threshold]
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field = ["host.id"]
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value = 10
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