Mika Ayenson
a52751494e
* Convert config header to setup in note field * Parse note field into separate setup and note field with marko gfm * only validate and parse note on elastic authored rules and add CLI description for new DR_BYPASS_NOTE_VALIDATION_AND_PARSE environment variable Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
94 lines
2.3 KiB
TOML
94 lines
2.3 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2021/01/19"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/03/31"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies native Windows host and network enumeration commands spawned by the Windows Management Instrumentation
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Provider Service (WMIPrvSE).
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE"
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note = """## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "770e0c4d-b998-41e5-a62e-c7901fd7f470"
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
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process.name:
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(
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"arp.exe",
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"dsquery.exe",
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"dsget.exe",
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"gpresult.exe",
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"hostname.exe",
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"ipconfig.exe",
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"nbtstat.exe",
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"net.exe",
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"net1.exe",
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"netsh.exe",
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"netstat.exe",
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"nltest.exe",
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"ping.exe",
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"qprocess.exe",
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"quser.exe",
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"qwinsta.exe",
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"reg.exe",
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"sc.exe",
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"systeminfo.exe",
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"tasklist.exe",
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"tracert.exe",
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"whoami.exe"
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) and
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process.parent.name:"wmiprvse.exe"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1047"
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name = "Windows Management Instrumentation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1018"
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name = "Remote System Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1087"
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name = "Account Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1518"
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name = "Software Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0007"
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name = "Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
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