Samirbous
b15f0de9a4
* [Rules Tuning] 7 diverse Windows rules Excluding FP patterns while avoiding breaking compat with winlogbeat and 4688 events lack of codesign metadata. * Update initial_access_suspicious_ms_exchange_process.toml * Update privilege_escalation_persistence_phantom_dll.toml * Update execution_psexec_lateral_movement_command.toml * Update persistence_remote_password_reset.toml * Update non-ecs-schema.json * Update persistence_remote_password_reset.toml * Update non-ecs-schema.json * Update discovery_privileged_localgroup_membership.toml
64 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
64 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/11/24"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/08/02"
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min_stack_comments = "Comprehensive timeline templates only available in 8.2+"
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min_stack_version = "8.2"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies the creation of a Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) default memory dump. This may
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indicate a credential access attempt via trusted system utilities such as Task Manager (taskmgr.exe) and SQL Dumper
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(sqldumper.exe) or known pentesting tools such as Dumpert and AndrewSpecial.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "LSASS Memory Dump Creation"
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note = """## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = ["https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert", "https://github.com/hoangprod/AndrewSpecial"]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "f2f46686-6f3c-4724-bd7d-24e31c70f98f"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Credential Access"]
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timeline_id = "4d4c0b59-ea83-483f-b8c1-8c360ee53c5c"
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timeline_title = "Comprehensive File Timeline"
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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file where file.name : ("lsass*.dmp", "dumpert.dmp", "Andrew.dmp", "SQLDmpr*.mdmp", "Coredump.dmp") and
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not (process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft SQL Server\\*\\Shared\\SqlDumper.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost.exe") and
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file.path : ("?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft SQL Server\\*\\Shared\\ErrorDumps\\SQLDmpr*.mdmp",
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"?:\\*\\Reporting Services\\Logfiles\\SQLDmpr*.mdmp")) and
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not (process.executable : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\WerFault.exe" and
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file.path : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\systemprofile\\AppData\\Local\\CrashDumps\\lsass.exe.*.dmp")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1003"
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name = "OS Credential Dumping"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1003.001"
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name = "LSASS Memory"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0006"
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name = "Credential Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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