c864538606
* [rule-tuning] Adding more context with triage/investigation
* Adding mimikatz rule
* Fixed updated date on mimikatz rule
* Adding Defender update
* Adding scheduled task
* Adding AdFind
* Adding rare process
* Adding cloudtrail country
* Adding cloudtrail spike
* Adding threat intel
* Fixed minor spelling/syntax
* Fixed minor spelling/syntax p2
* Update rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_module_match.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/integrations/aws/ml_cloudtrail_error_message_spike.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/ml/ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Removed MITRE link, added Microsoft
* Update ml_cloudtrail_error_message_spike.toml
* Update ml_cloudtrail_rare_method_by_country.toml
* Update ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml
* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
* Update defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml
* Update discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
* Update lateral_movement_dns_server_overflow.toml
* Update lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.toml
* Update persistence_evasion_registry_startup_shell_folder_modified.toml
* Update defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml
* Update lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.toml
* Update persistence_evasion_registry_startup_shell_folder_modified.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9ff3873ee7)
91 lines
4.9 KiB
TOML
91 lines
4.9 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/07/16"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2021/09/08"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Specially crafted DNS requests can manipulate a known overflow vulnerability in some Windows DNS servers which result in
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Remote Code Execution (RCE) or a Denial of Service (DoS) from crashing the service.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"""
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Environments that leverage DNS responses over 60k bytes will result in false positives - if this traffic is
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predictable and expected, it should be filtered out. Additionally, this detection rule could be triggered by an
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authorized vulnerability scan or compromise assessment.
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""",
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]
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index = ["packetbeat-*", "filebeat-*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Abnormally Large DNS Response"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Large DNS Responses
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Detection alerts from this rule indicate possible anomalous activity around large byte DNS responses from a Windows DNS
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server. This detection rule was created based on activity represented in exploitation of vulnerability (CVE-2020-1350)
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also known as [SigRed](https://www.elastic.co/blog/detection-rules-for-sigred-vulnerability) during July 2020.
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#### Possible investigation steps:
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- This specific rule is sourced from network log activity such as DNS or network level data. It's important to validate
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the source of the incoming traffic and determine if this activity has been observed previously within an environment.
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- Activity can be further investigated and validated by reviewing available corresponding Intrusion Detection Signatures (IDS) alerts associated with activity.
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- Further examination can be made by reviewing the `dns.question_type` network fieldset with a protocol analyzer, such as Zeek, Packetbeat, or Suricata, for `SIG` or `RRSIG` data.
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- Validate the patch level and OS of the targeted DNS server to validate the observed activity was not large-scale Internet vulnerability scanning.
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- Validate that the source of the network activity was not from an authorized vulnerability scan or compromise assessment.
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#### False Positive Analysis
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- Based on this rule which looks for a threshold of 60k bytes, it is possible for activity to be generated under 65k bytes
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and related to legitimate behavior. In packet capture files received by the [SANS Internet Storm Center](https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/PATCH+NOW+SIGRed+CVE20201350+Microsoft+DNS+Server+Vulnerability/26356/), byte responses
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were all observed as greater than 65k bytes.
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- This activity has the ability to be triggered from compliance/vulnerability scanning or compromise assessment, it's
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important to determine the source of the activity and potential whitelist the source host
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### Related Rules
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- Unusual Child Process of dns.exe
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- Unusual File Modification by dns.exe
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### Response and Remediation
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- Review and implement the above detection logic within your environment using technology such as Endpoint security, Winlogbeat, Packetbeat, or network security monitoring (NSM) platforms such as Zeek or Suricata.
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- Ensure that you have deployed the latest Microsoft [Security Update](https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1350) (Monthly Rollup or Security Only) and restart the
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patched machines. If unable to patch immediately: Microsoft [released](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability) a registry-based workaround that doesn’t require a
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restart. This can be used as a temporary solution before the patch is applied.
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- Maintain backups of your critical systems to aid in quick recovery.
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- Perform routine vulnerability scans of your systems, monitor [CISA advisories](https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity) and patch identified vulnerabilities.
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- If observed true positive activity, implement a remediation plan and monitor host-based artifacts for additional post-exploitation behavior.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/",
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"https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/07/14/july-2020-security-update-cve-2020-1350-vulnerability-in-windows-domain-name-system-dns-server/",
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"https://github.com/maxpl0it/CVE-2020-1350-DoS",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "11013227-0301-4a8c-b150-4db924484475"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Network", "Threat Detection", "Lateral Movement"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "query"
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query = '''
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event.category:(network or network_traffic) and destination.port:53 and
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(event.dataset:zeek.dns or type:dns or event.type:connection) and network.bytes > 60000
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1210"
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name = "Exploitation of Remote Services"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0008"
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name = "Lateral Movement"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
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