Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/lateral_movement_dns_server_overflow.toml
T
dstepanic17 c864538606 [rule-tuning] Adding more context with triage/investigation (#1481)
* [rule-tuning] Adding more context with triage/investigation

* Adding mimikatz rule

* Fixed updated date on mimikatz rule

* Adding Defender update

* Adding scheduled task

* Adding AdFind

* Adding rare process

* Adding cloudtrail country

* Adding cloudtrail spike

* Adding threat intel

* Fixed minor spelling/syntax

* Fixed minor spelling/syntax p2

* Update rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_module_match.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/integrations/aws/ml_cloudtrail_error_message_spike.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/ml/ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Removed MITRE link, added Microsoft

* Update ml_cloudtrail_error_message_spike.toml

* Update ml_cloudtrail_rare_method_by_country.toml

* Update ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml

* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml

* Update defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml

* Update discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml

* Update lateral_movement_dns_server_overflow.toml

* Update lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.toml

* Update persistence_evasion_registry_startup_shell_folder_modified.toml

* Update defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml

* Update lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.toml

* Update persistence_evasion_registry_startup_shell_folder_modified.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 9ff3873ee7)
2021-09-16 01:08:23 +00:00

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[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/07/16"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2021/09/08"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Specially crafted DNS requests can manipulate a known overflow vulnerability in some Windows DNS servers which result in
Remote Code Execution (RCE) or a Denial of Service (DoS) from crashing the service.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
Environments that leverage DNS responses over 60k bytes will result in false positives - if this traffic is
predictable and expected, it should be filtered out. Additionally, this detection rule could be triggered by an
authorized vulnerability scan or compromise assessment.
""",
]
index = ["packetbeat-*", "filebeat-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Abnormally Large DNS Response"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating Large DNS Responses
Detection alerts from this rule indicate possible anomalous activity around large byte DNS responses from a Windows DNS
server. This detection rule was created based on activity represented in exploitation of vulnerability (CVE-2020-1350)
also known as [SigRed](https://www.elastic.co/blog/detection-rules-for-sigred-vulnerability) during July 2020.
#### Possible investigation steps:
- This specific rule is sourced from network log activity such as DNS or network level data. It's important to validate
the source of the incoming traffic and determine if this activity has been observed previously within an environment.
- Activity can be further investigated and validated by reviewing available corresponding Intrusion Detection Signatures (IDS) alerts associated with activity.
- Further examination can be made by reviewing the `dns.question_type` network fieldset with a protocol analyzer, such as Zeek, Packetbeat, or Suricata, for `SIG` or `RRSIG` data.
- Validate the patch level and OS of the targeted DNS server to validate the observed activity was not large-scale Internet vulnerability scanning.
- Validate that the source of the network activity was not from an authorized vulnerability scan or compromise assessment.
#### False Positive Analysis
- Based on this rule which looks for a threshold of 60k bytes, it is possible for activity to be generated under 65k bytes
and related to legitimate behavior. In packet capture files received by the [SANS Internet Storm Center](https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/PATCH+NOW+SIGRed+CVE20201350+Microsoft+DNS+Server+Vulnerability/26356/), byte responses
were all observed as greater than 65k bytes.
- This activity has the ability to be triggered from compliance/vulnerability scanning or compromise assessment, it's
important to determine the source of the activity and potential whitelist the source host
### Related Rules
- Unusual Child Process of dns.exe
- Unusual File Modification by dns.exe
### Response and Remediation
- Review and implement the above detection logic within your environment using technology such as Endpoint security, Winlogbeat, Packetbeat, or network security monitoring (NSM) platforms such as Zeek or Suricata.
- Ensure that you have deployed the latest Microsoft [Security Update](https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1350) (Monthly Rollup or Security Only) and restart the
patched machines. If unable to patch immediately: Microsoft [released](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability) a registry-based workaround that doesnt require a
restart. This can be used as a temporary solution before the patch is applied.
- Maintain backups of your critical systems to aid in quick recovery.
- Perform routine vulnerability scans of your systems, monitor [CISA advisories](https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity) and patch identified vulnerabilities.
- If observed true positive activity, implement a remediation plan and monitor host-based artifacts for additional post-exploitation behavior.
"""
references = [
"https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/",
"https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/07/14/july-2020-security-update-cve-2020-1350-vulnerability-in-windows-domain-name-system-dns-server/",
"https://github.com/maxpl0it/CVE-2020-1350-DoS",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "11013227-0301-4a8c-b150-4db924484475"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Network", "Threat Detection", "Lateral Movement"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
event.category:(network or network_traffic) and destination.port:53 and
(event.dataset:zeek.dns or type:dns or event.type:connection) and network.bytes > 60000
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1210"
name = "Exploitation of Remote Services"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0008"
name = "Lateral Movement"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"