c864538606
* [rule-tuning] Adding more context with triage/investigation
* Adding mimikatz rule
* Fixed updated date on mimikatz rule
* Adding Defender update
* Adding scheduled task
* Adding AdFind
* Adding rare process
* Adding cloudtrail country
* Adding cloudtrail spike
* Adding threat intel
* Fixed minor spelling/syntax
* Fixed minor spelling/syntax p2
* Update rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_module_match.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/integrations/aws/ml_cloudtrail_error_message_spike.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/ml/ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/windows/discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Removed MITRE link, added Microsoft
* Update ml_cloudtrail_error_message_spike.toml
* Update ml_cloudtrail_rare_method_by_country.toml
* Update ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml
* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
* Update defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml
* Update discovery_adfind_command_activity.toml
* Update lateral_movement_dns_server_overflow.toml
* Update lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.toml
* Update persistence_evasion_registry_startup_shell_folder_modified.toml
* Update defense_evasion_defender_exclusion_via_powershell.toml
* Update lateral_movement_scheduled_task_target.toml
* Update persistence_evasion_registry_startup_shell_folder_modified.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9ff3873ee7)
67 lines
3.9 KiB
TOML
67 lines
3.9 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/03/25"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2021/09/13"
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[rule]
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anomaly_threshold = 50
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies rare processes that do not usually run on individual hosts, which can indicate execution of unauthorized
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services, malware, or persistence mechanisms. Processes are considered rare when they only run occasionally as compared
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with other processes running on the host.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"""
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A newly installed program or one that runs rarely as part of a monthly or quarterly workflow could trigger this
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alert.
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""",
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]
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from = "now-45m"
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interval = "15m"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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machine_learning_job_id = ["rare_process_by_host_windows_ecs", "v2_rare_process_by_host_windows_ecs"]
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name = "Unusual Process For a Windows Host"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating an Unusual Windows Process
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Searching for abnormal Windows processes is a good methodology to find potentially malicious activity within a network.
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By understanding what is commonly run within an environment and developing baselines for legitimate activity can help
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uncover potential malware and suspicious behaviors.
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#### Possible investigation steps:
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- Consider the user as identified by the `user.name` field. Is this program part of an expected workflow for the user who ran this program on this host?
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- Examine the history of execution. If this process only manifested recently, it might be part of a new software package. If it has a consistent cadence (for example if it runs monthly or quarterly), it might be part of a monthly or quarterly business process.
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- Examine the process metadata like the values of the Company, Description and Product fields which may indicate whether the program is associated with an expected software vendor or package.
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- Examine arguments and working directory. These may provide indications as to the source of the program or the nature of the tasks it is performing.
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- Consider the same for the parent process. If the parent process is a legitimate system utility or service, this could be related to software updates or system management. If the parent process is something user-facing like an Office application, this process could be more suspicious.
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- If you have file hash values in the event data, and you suspect malware, you can optionally run a search for the file hash to see if the file is identified as malware by anti-malware tools.
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### False Positive Analysis
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- Validate the unusual Windows process is not related to new benign software installation activity. If related to
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legitimate software, this can be done by leveraging the exception workflow in the Kibana Security App or Elasticsearch
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API to tune this rule to your environment
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- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. It's possible that a small number of endpoints
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such as servers that have very unique software that might appear to be unusual, but satisfy a specific business need.
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### Related Rules
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- Anomalous Windows Process Creation
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- Unusual Windows Path Activity
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- Unusual Windows Process Calling the Metadata Service
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### Response and Remediation
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- This rule is related to process execution events and should be immediately reviewed and investigated to determine if malicious
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- Based on validation and if malicious, the impacted machine should be isolated and analyzed to determine other post-compromise
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behavior such as setting up persistence or performing lateral movement.
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- Look into preventive measures such as Windows Defender Application Control and AppLocker to gain better control on
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what is allowed to run on Windows infrastructure.
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"""
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references = ["https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/prebuilt-ml-jobs.html"]
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "6d448b96-c922-4adb-b51c-b767f1ea5b76"
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "ML"]
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type = "machine_learning"
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