Files
sigma-rules/rules/integrations/aws/initial_access_password_recovery.toml
T
Ross Wolf 600acca704 [Fleet] Track integrations in folder and metadata (#1372)
* Track integrations in folder and metadata
* Remove duplicate entry
* Update note and tests

(cherry picked from commit 1882f4456c)
2021-07-21 21:25:48 +00:00

55 lines
1.6 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/07/02"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2021/07/20"
integration = "aws"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies AWS IAM password recovery requests. An adversary may attempt to gain unauthorized AWS access by abusing
password recovery mechanisms.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be requesting changes in your environment.
Password reset attempts from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives,
it can be exempted from the rule.
""",
]
from = "now-60m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws*"]
interval = "10m"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AWS IAM Password Recovery Requested"
note = """## Config
The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
references = ["https://www.cadosecurity.com/2020/06/11/an-ongoing-aws-phishing-campaign/"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "69c420e8-6c9e-4d28-86c0-8a2be2d1e78c"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Elastic", "Cloud", "AWS", "Continuous Monitoring", "SecOps", "Identity and Access"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:signin.amazonaws.com and event.action:PasswordRecoveryRequested and event.outcome:success
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"