Jonhnathan
b4c84e8a40
* Update Tags * Bump updated date separately to be easy to revert if needed * Update resource_development_ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml * Apply changes from the discussion * Update persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml * Update defense_evasion_timestomp_sysmon.toml * Update defense_evasion_application_removed_from_blocklist_in_google_workspace.toml * Update missing Tactic tags * Update unit tests to match new tags * Add missing IG tags * Delete okta_threat_detected_by_okta_threatinsight.toml * Update command_and_control_google_drive_malicious_file_download.toml * Update persistence_rc_script_creation.toml * Mass bump * Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml * . --------- Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
90 lines
3.5 KiB
TOML
90 lines
3.5 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/12/19"
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integration = ["windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "The New Term rule type used in this rule was added in Elastic 8.4"
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min_stack_version = "8.4.0"
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updated_date = "2023/06/22"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process for the first time.
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Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain,
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thus compromising the entire domain.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "FirstTime Seen Account Performing DCSync"
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note = """## Setup
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The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
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Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
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```
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Computer Configuration >
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Policies >
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Windows Settings >
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Security Settings >
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Advanced Audit Policies Configuration >
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Audit Policies >
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DS Access >
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Audit Directory Service Changes (Success,Failure)
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```
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-180815210510.html",
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"https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html?highlight=dcsync#directory-replication-services-auditing",
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"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml",
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"https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0027_windows_audit_directory_service_access.md",
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"https://attack.stealthbits.com/privilege-escalation-using-mimikatz-dcsync",
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"https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/credentials/dumping/dcsync",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "5c6f4c58-b381-452a-8976-f1b1c6aa0def"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring", "Data Source: Active Directory"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "new_terms"
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query = '''
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event.action:"Directory Service Access" and event.code:"4662" and
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winlog.event_data.Properties:(*DS-Replication-Get-Changes* or *DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All* or
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*DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set* or *1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2* or
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*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2* or *89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*) and
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not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName:(*$ or MSOL_*)
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1003"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
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name = "OS Credential Dumping"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1003.006"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/"
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name = "DCSync"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0006"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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name = "Credential Access"
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[rule.new_terms]
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field = "new_terms_fields"
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value = ["winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName"]
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[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
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field = "history_window_start"
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value = "now-15d"
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