Files
sigma-rules/rules/linux/credential_access_ssh_backdoor_log.toml
T
Mika Ayenson a52751494e 2058 add setup field to metadata (#2061)
* Convert config header to setup in note field
* Parse note field into separate setup and note field with marko gfm
* only validate and parse note on elastic authored rules and add CLI description for new DR_BYPASS_NOTE_VALIDATION_AND_PARSE environment variable

Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-07-18 15:41:32 -04:00

92 lines
2.8 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/12/21"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2022/03/31"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file.
Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to
enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration.
"""
false_positives = ["Updates to approved and trusted SSH executables can trigger this rule."]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity"
note = """## Setup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
references = [
"https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/sshdoor",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ESET_Kobalos.pdf",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "f28e2be4-6eca-4349-bdd9-381573730c22"
severity = "high"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Persistence", "Credential Access"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
file where event.type == "change" and process.executable : ("/usr/sbin/sshd", "/usr/bin/ssh") and
(
file.name : (".*", "~*") or
file.extension : ("in", "out", "ini", "h", "gz", "so", "sock", "sync", "0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9") or
file.path :
(
"/private/etc/*--",
"/usr/share/*",
"/usr/include/*",
"/usr/local/include/*",
"/private/tmp/*",
"/private/var/tmp/*",
"/usr/tmp/*",
"/usr/share/man/*",
"/usr/local/share/*",
"/usr/lib/*.so.*",
"/private/etc/ssh/.sshd_auth",
"/usr/bin/ssd",
"/private/var/opt/power",
"/private/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts",
"/private/var/html/lol",
"/private/var/log/utmp",
"/private/var/lib",
"/var/run/sshd/sshd.pid",
"/var/run/nscd/ns.pid",
"/var/run/udev/ud.pid",
"/var/run/udevd.pid"
)
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1556"
name = "Modify Authentication Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1554"
name = "Compromise Client Software Binary"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"