290763d9bb
* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 4 * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/initial_access_script_executing_powershell.toml Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com> * lint * Update persistence_user_account_creation.toml * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com> * . * Fixes and lint * . * . * revert modifications * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> * Update impact_stop_process_service_threshold.toml Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
104 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
104 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/11/18"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/03/31"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies script engines creating files in the Startup folder, or the creation of script files in the Startup folder.
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Adversaries may abuse this technique to maintain persistence in an environment.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory
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The Windows Startup folder is a special folder in Windows. Programs added to this folder are executed during account
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logon, without user interaction, providing an excellent way for attackers to maintain persistence.
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This rule looks for shortcuts created by wscript.exe or cscript.exe, or js/vbs scripts created by any process.
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#### Possible investigation steps
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- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree).
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- Investigate other alerts related to the user/host in the last 48 hours.
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- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate
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software installations.
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- Determine if activity is unique by validating if other machines in the organization have similar entries.
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- Retrieve the script file:
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- Use a sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
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- Observe attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
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- Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the SHA-256 hash value of the file.
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- Search for the existence and reputation of this file in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
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### False positive analysis
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- There is a low possibility of benign legitimate scripts being added to Startup folders. Validate whether this activity
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is benign.
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### Related rules
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- Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification - c8b150f0-0164-475b-a75e-74b47800a9ff
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- Startup Folder Persistence via Unsigned Process - 2fba96c0-ade5-4bce-b92f-a5df2509da3f
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### Response and remediation
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- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
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- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
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- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
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- Implement any temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation required to contain the malware.
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- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
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- Reset passwords for the user account and other potentially compromised accounts (email, services, CRMs, etc.).
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## Config
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "f7c4dc5a-a58d-491d-9f14-9b66507121c0"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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file where event.type != "deletion" and user.domain != "NT AUTHORITY" and
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/* detect shortcuts created by wscript.exe or cscript.exe */
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(file.path : "C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.lnk" and
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process.name : ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")) or
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/* detect vbs or js files created by any process */
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file.path : ("C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.vbs",
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"C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.vbe",
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"C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.wsh",
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"C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.wsf",
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"C:\\*\\Programs\\Startup\\*.js")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1547"
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name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1547.001"
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name = "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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