Jonhnathan
b4c84e8a40
* Update Tags * Bump updated date separately to be easy to revert if needed * Update resource_development_ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml * Apply changes from the discussion * Update persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml * Update defense_evasion_timestomp_sysmon.toml * Update defense_evasion_application_removed_from_blocklist_in_google_workspace.toml * Update missing Tactic tags * Update unit tests to match new tags * Add missing IG tags * Delete okta_threat_detected_by_okta_threatinsight.toml * Update command_and_control_google_drive_malicious_file_download.toml * Update persistence_rc_script_creation.toml * Mass bump * Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml * . --------- Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
82 lines
2.9 KiB
TOML
82 lines
2.9 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
|
|
creation_date = "2021/02/23"
|
|
integration = ["endpoint"]
|
|
maturity = "production"
|
|
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
|
|
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
|
|
updated_date = "2023/06/22"
|
|
|
|
[rule]
|
|
author = ["Elastic"]
|
|
description = """
|
|
Detects the execution of a MacOS installer package with an abnormal child process (e.g bash) followed immediately by a
|
|
network connection via a suspicious process (e.g curl). Threat actors will build and distribute malicious MacOS
|
|
installer packages, which have a .pkg extension, many times imitating valid software in order to persuade and infect
|
|
their victims often using the package files (e.g pre/post install scripts etc.) to download additional tools or
|
|
malicious software. If this rule fires it should indicate the installation of a malicious or suspicious package.
|
|
"""
|
|
false_positives = [
|
|
"""
|
|
Custom organization-specific macOS packages that use .pkg files to run cURL could trigger this rule. If known
|
|
behavior is causing false positives, it can be excluded from the rule.
|
|
""",
|
|
]
|
|
from = "now-9m"
|
|
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
|
|
language = "eql"
|
|
license = "Elastic License v2"
|
|
name = "MacOS Installer Package Spawns Network Event"
|
|
references = [
|
|
"https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings",
|
|
"https://posts.specterops.io/introducing-mystikal-4fbd2f7ae520",
|
|
"https://github.com/D00MFist/Mystikal",
|
|
]
|
|
risk_score = 47
|
|
rule_id = "99239e7d-b0d4-46e3-8609-acafcf99f68c"
|
|
severity = "medium"
|
|
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: macOS", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Execution", "Tactic: Command and Control"]
|
|
type = "eql"
|
|
|
|
query = '''
|
|
sequence by host.id, user.id with maxspan=30s
|
|
[process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.parent.name : ("installer", "package_script_service") and process.name : ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "python", "osascript", "tclsh*")]
|
|
[network where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type == "start" and process.name : ("curl", "osascript", "wget", "python")]
|
|
'''
|
|
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat]]
|
|
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1059"
|
|
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
|
|
id = "T1059.007"
|
|
name = "JavaScript"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[rule.threat.tactic]
|
|
id = "TA0002"
|
|
name = "Execution"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
|
|
[[rule.threat]]
|
|
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1071"
|
|
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
|
|
id = "T1071.001"
|
|
name = "Web Protocols"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[rule.threat.tactic]
|
|
id = "TA0011"
|
|
name = "Command and Control"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
|
|
|