Justin Ibarra
eeb8ab7744
* Expand timestamp_override tests
* removed timestamp_override from eql sequence rules
* add config entry for eql rules with beats index and t_o
* add timestamp_override to missing fields
Removed changes from:
- rules/cross-platform/impact_hosts_file_modified.toml
- rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_adding_the_hidden_file_attribute_with_via_attribexe.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_lolbas_wuauclt.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_suspicious_certutil_commands.toml
- rules/windows/execution_command_shell_started_by_svchost.toml
(selectively cherry picked from commit 6bdfddac8e)
75 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
75 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2021/08/24"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/03/31"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = "Identifies suspicious commands executed via a web server, which may suggest a vulnerability and remote shell access."
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false_positives = [
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"""
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Security audits, maintenance, and network administrative scripts may trigger this alert when run under web
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processes.
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""",
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]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Webshell Detection: Script Process Child of Common Web Processes"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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Detections should be investigated to identify if the activity corresponds to legitimate activity. As this rule detects post-exploitation process activity, investigations into this should be prioritized.
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## Config
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "2917d495-59bd-4250-b395-c29409b76086"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type == "start" and
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process.parent.name : ("w3wp.exe", "httpd.exe", "nginx.exe", "php.exe", "php-cgi.exe", "tomcat.exe") and
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process.name : ("cmd.exe", "cscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "wmic.exe", "wscript.exe")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1505"
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name = "Server Software Component"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1505.003"
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name = "Web Shell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1190"
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name = "Exploit Public-Facing Application"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0001"
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name = "Initial Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
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