Ruben Groenewoud
a1716bd673
* [Rule Tuning] Several rule tunings * Added 1 more * optimized ransomware encryption rules * Update rules/linux/impact_potential_linux_ransomware_file_encryption.toml * Update rules/linux/impact_potential_linux_ransomware_note_detected.toml * Added 2 more tunings based on todays telemetry * Some tunings * Tuning * Tuning * fixed user.id comparison * Something went wrong with deprecation * Something went wrong with deprecation * Update rules/linux/impact_potential_linux_ransomware_file_encryption.toml * Update rules/linux/discovery_linux_nping_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/linux/discovery_linux_hping_activity.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Dedeprecated the rule to deprecate later --------- Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
94 lines
2.8 KiB
TOML
94 lines
2.8 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/12/21"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/08/24"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access by patching sensitive functions to
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enable unauthorized access or by logging SSH credentials for exfiltration.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"Trusted OpenSSH executable updates. It's recommended to verify the integrity of OpenSSH binary changes.",
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]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Modification of OpenSSH Binaries"
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references = ["https://blog.angelalonso.es/2016/09/anatomy-of-real-linux-intrusion-part-ii.html"]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "0415f22a-2336-45fa-ba07-618a5942e22c"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Tactic: Persistence", "Tactic: Lateral Movement", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "query"
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query = '''
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event.category:file and host.os.type:linux and event.type:change and
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process.name:(* and not (dnf or dnf-automatic or dpkg or yum or rpm or yum-cron or anacron)) and
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(file.path:(/usr/bin/scp or
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/usr/bin/sftp or
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/usr/bin/ssh or
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/usr/sbin/sshd) or
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file.name:libkeyutils.so)
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1543"
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name = "Create or Modify System Process"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1556"
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name = "Modify Authentication Process"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0006"
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name = "Credential Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1021"
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name = "Remote Services"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1021.004"
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name = "SSH"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1563"
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name = "Remote Service Session Hijacking"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1563.001"
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name = "SSH Hijacking"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0008"
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name = "Lateral Movement"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
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