Jonhnathan
b4c84e8a40
* Update Tags * Bump updated date separately to be easy to revert if needed * Update resource_development_ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml * Apply changes from the discussion * Update persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml * Update defense_evasion_timestomp_sysmon.toml * Update defense_evasion_application_removed_from_blocklist_in_google_workspace.toml * Update missing Tactic tags * Update unit tests to match new tags * Add missing IG tags * Delete okta_threat_detected_by_okta_threatinsight.toml * Update command_and_control_google_drive_malicious_file_download.toml * Update persistence_rc_script_creation.toml * Mass bump * Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml * . --------- Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
56 lines
2.1 KiB
TOML
56 lines
2.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/11/17"
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integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/06/22"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies a suspicious image load (wmiutils.dll) from Microsoft Office processes. This behavior may indicate
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adversarial activity where child processes are spawned via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This technique can
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be used to execute code and evade traditional parent/child processes spawned from Microsoft Office products.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office"
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note = """## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16",
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]
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "891cb88e-441a-4c3e-be2d-120d99fe7b0d"
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Execution", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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any where host.os.type == "windows" and
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(event.category : ("library", "driver") or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
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process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSPUB.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
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(dll.name : "wmiutils.dll" or file.name : "wmiutils.dll")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1047"
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name = "Windows Management Instrumentation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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