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sigma-rules/rules/macos/credential_access_credentials_keychains.toml
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Jonhnathan b4c84e8a40 [Security Content] Tags Reform (#2725)
* Update Tags

* Bump updated date separately to be easy to revert if needed

* Update resource_development_ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml

* Apply changes from the discussion

* Update persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml

* Update defense_evasion_timestomp_sysmon.toml

* Update defense_evasion_application_removed_from_blocklist_in_google_workspace.toml

* Update missing Tactic tags

* Update unit tests to match new tags

* Add missing IG tags

* Delete okta_threat_detected_by_okta_threatinsight.toml

* Update command_and_control_google_drive_malicious_file_download.toml

* Update persistence_rc_script_creation.toml

* Mass bump

* Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml

* .

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Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-06-22 18:38:56 -03:00

85 lines
2.9 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/08/14"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/06/22"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way
for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords,
websites, secure notes and certificates.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Access to Keychain Credentials Directories"
note = """## Setup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
references = [
"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html",
"https://securelist.com/calisto-trojan-for-macos/86543/",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "96e90768-c3b7-4df6-b5d9-6237f8bc36a8"
severity = "high"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: macOS", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Credential Access"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.args :
(
"/Users/*/Library/Keychains/*",
"/Library/Keychains/*",
"/Network/Library/Keychains/*",
"System.keychain",
"login.keychain-db",
"login.keychain"
) and
not process.args : ("find-certificate",
"add-trusted-cert",
"set-keychain-settings",
"delete-certificate",
"/Users/*/Library/Keychains/openvpn.keychain-db",
"show-keychain-info",
"lock-keychain",
"set-key-partition-list",
"import",
"find-identity") and
not process.parent.executable :
(
"/Applications/OpenVPN Connect/OpenVPN Connect.app/Contents/MacOS/OpenVPN Connect",
"/Applications/Microsoft Defender.app/Contents/MacOS/wdavdaemon_enterprise.app/Contents/MacOS/wdavdaemon_enterprise",
"/opt/jc/bin/jumpcloud-agent"
) and
not process.executable : "/opt/jc/bin/jumpcloud-agent"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1555"
name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1555.001"
name = "Keychain"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"