eric-forte-elastic
aaa4ce2ea0
* Fixed kql -> kuery in test_all_rule_queries_opt... * all queries optimized * manually reconciled all rules that failed due to toml escaped chars * merge rules from main * Rules needing optimization * Fix optimized note * fix another note * another note fix * fixing whitespace * Updated for readability --------- Co-authored-by: terrancedejesus <terrance.dejesus@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
65 lines
2.3 KiB
TOML
65 lines
2.3 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2023/06/09"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup, New Term"
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min_stack_version = "8.6.0"
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updated_date = "2023/06/22"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This rule monitors the creation of shared object files by previously unknown processes. The creation of a shared object
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file involves compiling code into a dynamically linked library that can be loaded by other programs at runtime. While
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this process is typically used for legitimate purposes, malicious actors can leverage shared object files to execute
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unauthorized code, inject malicious functionality into legitimate processes, or bypass security controls. This allows
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malware to persist on the system, evade detection, and potentially compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the
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affected system and its data.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Shared Object Created or Changed by Previously Unknown Process"
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references = ["https://threatpost.com/sneaky-malware-backdoors-linux/180158/"]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "aebaa51f-2a91-4f6a-850b-b601db2293f4"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "new_terms"
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query = '''
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host.os.type:linux and event.action:(creation or file_create_event or file_rename_event or rename) and
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file.path:(/dev/shm/* or /usr/lib/*) and file.extension:so and
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process.name:(* and not (5 or dockerd or dpkg or rpm or snapd))
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1574"
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name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1574.006"
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name = "Dynamic Linker Hijacking"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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[rule.new_terms]
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field = "new_terms_fields"
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value = ["file.path", "process.name"]
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[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
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field = "history_window_start"
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value = "now-7d"
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