Files
sigma-rules/rules/linux/defense_evasion_mount_execution.toml
T
Jonhnathan b4c84e8a40 [Security Content] Tags Reform (#2725)
* Update Tags

* Bump updated date separately to be easy to revert if needed

* Update resource_development_ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml

* Apply changes from the discussion

* Update persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml

* Update defense_evasion_timestomp_sysmon.toml

* Update defense_evasion_application_removed_from_blocklist_in_google_workspace.toml

* Update missing Tactic tags

* Update unit tests to match new tags

* Add missing IG tags

* Delete okta_threat_detected_by_okta_threatinsight.toml

* Update command_and_control_google_drive_malicious_file_download.toml

* Update persistence_rc_script_creation.toml

* Mass bump

* Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml

* .

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Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-06-22 18:38:56 -03:00

52 lines
1.9 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/04/11"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/04/11"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the execution of mount process with hidepid parameter, which can make processes invisible to
other users from the system. Adversaries using Linux kernel version 3.2+ (or RHEL/CentOS v6.5+ above) can hide
the process from other users. When hidepid=2 option is executed to mount the /proc filesystem, only the root user
can see all processes and the logged-in user can only see their own process. This provides a defense evasion mechanism for
the adversaries to hide their process executions from all other commands such as ps, top, pgrep and more.
With the Linux kernel hardening hidepid option all the user has to do is remount the /proc filesystem with the option,
which can now be monitored and detected.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Hidden Process via Mount Hidepid"
references = [
"https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-hide-processes-from-other-users/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "dc71c186-9fe4-4437-a4d0-85ebb32b8204"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Defense Evasion"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where process.name=="mount" and event.action =="exec" and
process.args: ( "/proc") and process.args: ("-o") and process.args:("*hidepid=2*") and
host.os.type == "linux"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1564"
name = "Hide Artifacts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"