Jonhnathan
b4c84e8a40
* Update Tags * Bump updated date separately to be easy to revert if needed * Update resource_development_ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml * Apply changes from the discussion * Update persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml * Update defense_evasion_timestomp_sysmon.toml * Update defense_evasion_application_removed_from_blocklist_in_google_workspace.toml * Update missing Tactic tags * Update unit tests to match new tags * Add missing IG tags * Delete okta_threat_detected_by_okta_threatinsight.toml * Update command_and_control_google_drive_malicious_file_download.toml * Update persistence_rc_script_creation.toml * Mass bump * Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml * . --------- Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
59 lines
2.2 KiB
TOML
59 lines
2.2 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/07/22"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/06/22"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Detects a file being made immutable using the chattr binary. Making a file immutable means it cannot be deleted or
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renamed, no link can be created to this file, most of the file's metadata can not be modified, and the file can not be
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opened in write mode. Threat actors will commonly utilize this to prevent tampering or modification of their malicious
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files or any system files they have modified for purposes of persistence (e.g .ssh, /etc/passwd, etc.).
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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max_signals = 33
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name = "File made Immutable by Chattr"
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note = """## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "968ccab9-da51-4a87-9ce2-d3c9782fd759"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and user.name == "root" and
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process.executable : "/usr/bin/chattr" and process.args : ("-*i*", "+*i*") and
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not process.parent.executable: ("/lib/systemd/systemd", "/usr/local/uems_agent/bin/*")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1222"
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name = "File and Directory Permissions Modification"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1222.002"
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name = "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0005"
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name = "Defense Evasion"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
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