Mika Ayenson
62298d92f4
* Convert config header to setup in note field
* Parse note field into separate setup and note field with marko gfm
* only validate and parse note on elastic authored rules and add CLI description for new DR_BYPASS_NOTE_VALIDATION_AND_PARSE environment variable
Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
Removed changes from:
- rules/cross-platform/impact_hosts_file_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/application_added_to_google_workspace_domain.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/domain_added_to_google_workspace_trusted_domains.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_admin_role_deletion.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_policy_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/mfa_disabled_for_google_workspace_organization.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_admin_role_assigned_to_user.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_api_access_granted_via_domain_wide_delegation_of_authority.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_custom_admin_role_created.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_role_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/kubernetes/execution_user_exec_to_pod.toml
- rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_adding_the_hidden_file_attribute_with_via_attribexe.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_lolbas_wuauclt.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_suspicious_certutil_commands.toml
- rules/windows/execution_command_shell_started_by_svchost.toml
(selectively cherry picked from commit a52751494e)
54 lines
1.8 KiB
TOML
54 lines
1.8 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/10/19"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/03/31"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = "Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused by attackers to host malicious code."
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false_positives = ["Microsoft Windows installers leveraging RunDLL32 for installation."]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32"
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note = """## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "9ccf3ce0-0057-440a-91f5-870c6ad39093"
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type == "start" and
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process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and
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process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.parent.command_line != null and
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/* common FPs can be added here */
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not process.parent.args : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\SHELL32.dll,RunAsNewUser_RunDLL",
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"C:\\WINDOWS\\*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1059"
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name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1059.001"
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name = "PowerShell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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