Files
sigma-rules/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_rds_instance_creation.toml
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Mika Ayenson a52751494e 2058 add setup field to metadata (#2061)
* Convert config header to setup in note field
* Parse note field into separate setup and note field with marko gfm
* only validate and parse note on elastic authored rules and add CLI description for new DR_BYPASS_NOTE_VALIDATION_AND_PARSE environment variable

Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
2022-07-18 15:41:32 -04:00

47 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2021/06/06"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2021/09/30"
integration = "aws"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
description = "Identifies the creation of an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) Aurora database instance."
false_positives = [
"""
A database instance may be created by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user
agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Instances creations by unfamiliar users or
hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
""",
]
from = "now-60m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws*"]
interval = "10m"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AWS RDS Instance Creation"
note = """## Setup
The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
references = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_CreateDBInstance.html"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "f30f3443-4fbb-4c27-ab89-c3ad49d62315"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Elastic", "Cloud", "AWS", "Continuous Monitoring", "SecOps", "Asset Visibility"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:rds.amazonaws.com and event.action:CreateDBInstance and event.outcome:success
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"