Jonhnathan
1c50f35aed
* Adds suggestions from security-docs * Update rules/windows/lateral_movement_powershell_remoting_target.toml Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
102 lines
3.2 KiB
TOML
102 lines
3.2 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2021/10/15"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/02/28"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Detects the presence of a portable executable (PE) in a PowerShell script by looking for its encoded header. Attackers
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embed PEs into PowerShell scripts to inject them into memory, avoiding defences by not writing to disk.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script"
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note = """## Triage and analysis.
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### Investigating Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script
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PowerShell is one of the main tools used by system administrators for automation, report routines, and other tasks.
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Attackers can abuse PowerShell in-memory capabilities to inject executables into memory without touching the disk,
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bypassing antivirus software. These executables are generally base64 encoded.
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#### Possible investigation steps:
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- Examine script content that triggered the detection.
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- Investigate script execution chain (parent process tree).
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- Inspect any file or network events from the suspicious PowerShell host process instance.
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- If the action is suspicious for the user, check for any other activities done by the user in the last 48 hours.
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### False Positive Analysis
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- Verify whether the script content is malicious/harmful.
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### Related Rules
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- PowerShell Reflection Assembly Load - e26f042e-c590-4e82-8e05-41e81bd822ad
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- PowerShell Suspicious Payload Encoded and Compressed - 81fe9dc6-a2d7-4192-a2d8-eed98afc766a
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- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
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### Response and Remediation
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- Immediate response steps should be taken to validate, investigate, and potentially contain the activity to prevent
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further post-compromise behavior.
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## Config
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The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
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Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
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```
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Computer Configuration >
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Administrative Templates >
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Windows PowerShell >
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Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
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```
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Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
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```
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reg add "hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
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```
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"""
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references = [
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"https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md"
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "ad84d445-b1ce-4377-82d9-7c633f28bf9a"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "query"
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query = '''
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event.category:process and
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powershell.file.script_block_text : (
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TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA
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)
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1059"
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name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1059.001"
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name = "PowerShell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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