e1205cb5c5
* [New/Tuning] Windows Top Threats 2024/2025 1) MSHTA: - tuning to exclude FPs - new rule `Remote Script via Microsoft HTML Application` compatible with 3d party EDR/sysmon/system/winlog integration and that does not require correlation or multiple type of events. 2) MSIEXEC: * Update defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml * Update defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml * Update defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml * Create defense_evasion_msiexec_remote_payload.toml * Update defense_evasion_msiexec_remote_payload.toml * ++ * Create execution_scripting_remote_webdav.toml * Create execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml * Create command_and_control_rmm_netsupport_susp_path.toml * Update command_and_control_rmm_netsupport_susp_path.toml * ++ * Update execution_jscript_fake_updates.toml * Create command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml * ++ * Create command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml * Update execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml * Update execution_scripts_archive_file.toml * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * ++ * Create execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml * Update execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml * Update execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml * Fix unit test errors * Update defense_evasion_network_connection_from_windows_binary.toml * Add system index * Add tag * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> * Remove duplicate * Update defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Create credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml * Update credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml * ++ * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/execution_windows_phish_clickfix.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml * Update execution_windows_phish_clickfix.toml * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Update defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml --------- Co-authored-by: eric-forte-elastic <eric.forte@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
105 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
105 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2025/08/20"
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integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "m365_defender", "system"]
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2025/08/20"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies known execution traces of the REMCOS Remote Access Trojan. Remcos RAT is used by attackers to perform actions on infected machines remotely.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = [
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"endgame-*",
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"logs-endpoint.events.registry-*",
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"logs-endpoint.events.file-*",
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"logs-m365_defender.event-*",
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"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
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"logs-system.security*",
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"logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
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"winlogbeat-*",
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]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Potential REMCOS Trojan Execution"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Potential REMCOS Trojan Execution
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Remcos RAT is used by attackers to perform actions on infected machines remotely.
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### Possible investigation steps
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- Review the origin of the REMCOS file and the execution chain to identify the initial vector..
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- Examine if the process is set to persist in the affected system via scheduled task, Startup folder or Run key.
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- Check the network, files and child processes activity associated with the every suspicious process in the execution chain of REMCOS.
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- Correlate the event with other security alerts or logs from data sources like Elastic Defend or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to gather additional context and identify any related malicious activities.
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### Response and remediation
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- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the attacker.
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- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert, such as PowerShell, cmd.exe, or other flagged executables, to halt any ongoing malicious activity.
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- Review and revoke any unauthorized user accounts or privileges that may have been created or modified using tools like net.exe or schtasks.exe.
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- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using endpoint protection tools to identify and remove any malware or unauthorized software installed by the attacker.
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- Restore the system from a known good backup if any critical system files or configurations have been altered or compromised.
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- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
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- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for ScreenConnect and other remote access tools to detect similar activities in the future, ensuring that alerts are promptly reviewed and acted upon."""
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references = [
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"https://any.run/malware-trends/remcos",
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"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332/",
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"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-ref2731-intrusion-set"
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "d8b2f85a-cf1c-40fc-acf0-bb5d588a8ea6"
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severity = "high"
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tags = [
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"Domain: Endpoint",
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"OS: Windows",
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"Use Case: Threat Detection",
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"Tactic: Command and Control",
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"Resources: Investigation Guide",
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"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
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"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
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"Data Source: Sysmon",
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"Data Source: SentinelOne",
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"Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
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"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs"
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]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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any where host.os.type == "windows" and
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(
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(event.category == "file" and event.type == "deletion" and file.path like "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\TH????.tmp") or
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(event.category == "file" and file.path : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\remcos\\logs.dat") or
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(event.category == "registry" and
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registry.value : ("Remcos", "Rmc-??????", "licence") and
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registry.path : (
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"*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\Remcos",
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"*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\Rmc-??????",
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"*\\SOFTWARE\\Remcos-*\\licence",
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"*\\Software\\Rmc-??????\\licence"
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)
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)
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)
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1219"
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name = "Remote Access Tools"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0011"
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name = "Command and Control"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
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