Justin Ibarra
46d5e37b76
* min_stack all rules to 8.3 * bump date Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
46 lines
1.6 KiB
TOML
46 lines
1.6 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/01/31"
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2022/08/24"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Detects modifications in the AdminSDHolder object. Attackers can abuse the SDProp process to implement a persistent
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backdoor in Active Directory. SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the
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AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on
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the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, regaining their
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Administrative Privileges.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "AdminSDHolder Backdoor"
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references = [
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"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1906",
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"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory#adminsdholder",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "6e9130a5-9be6-48e5-943a-9628bfc74b18"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Persistence", "Active Directory"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "query"
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query = '''
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event.action:"Directory Service Changes" and event.code:5136 and winlog.event_data.ObjectDN:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System*
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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name = "Persistence"
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