Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/initial_access_suspicious_ms_exchange_files.toml
T
Justin Ibarra 46d5e37b76 min_stack all rules to 8.3 (#2259)
* min_stack all rules to 8.3

* bump date

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
2022-08-24 10:38:49 -06:00

85 lines
3.4 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2021/03/04"
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2022/08/24"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
description = """
Identifies suspicious files being written by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity
has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26858.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
Files generated during installation will generate a lot of noise, so the rule should only be enabled after the fact.
""",
"""
This rule was tuned using the following baseline:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/main/Security/Baselines/baseline_15.2.792.5.csv from
Microsoft. Depending on version, consult https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security/Baselines to
help determine normalcy.
""",
]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Microsoft Exchange Server UM Writing Suspicious Files"
note = """## Triage and analysis
Positive hits can be checked against the established Microsoft [baselines](https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security/Baselines).
Microsoft highly recommends that the best course of action is patching, but this may not protect already compromised systems
from existing intrusions. Other tools for detecting and mitigating can be found within their Exchange support
[repository](https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security)
## Setup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
references = [
"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers",
"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "6cd1779c-560f-4b68-a8f1-11009b27fe63"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Initial Access"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
file where event.type == "creation" and
process.name : ("UMWorkerProcess.exe", "umservice.exe") and
file.extension : ("php", "jsp", "js", "aspx", "asmx", "asax", "cfm", "shtml") and
(
file.path : "?:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\*" or
(file.path : "?:\\*\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\*" and
not (file.path : "?:\\*\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\version\\*" or
file.name : ("errorFE.aspx", "expiredpassword.aspx", "frowny.aspx", "GetIdToken.htm", "logoff.aspx",
"logon.aspx", "OutlookCN.aspx", "RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx", "signout.aspx"))) or
(file.path : "?:\\*\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\ecp\\auth\\*" and
not file.name : "TimeoutLogoff.aspx")
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1190"
name = "Exploit Public-Facing Application"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"