Justin Ibarra
46d5e37b76
* min_stack all rules to 8.3 * bump date Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
54 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
54 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/04/25"
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2022/08/24"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies attempts to create or modify a crontab via a process that is not crontab (i.e python, osascript, etc.). This
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activity should not be highly prevalent and could indicate the use of cron as a persistence mechanism by a threat actor.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious CronTab Creation or Modification"
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references = [
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"https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf",
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"https://theevilbit.github.io/beyond/beyond_0004/",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "530178da-92ea-43ce-94c2-8877a826783d"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "macOS", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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file where event.type != "deletion" and process.name != null and
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file.path : "/private/var/at/tabs/*" and not process.executable == "/usr/bin/crontab"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1053"
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name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1053.003"
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name = "Cron"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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