Files
sigma-rules/rules/integrations/aws/initial_access_password_recovery.toml
T
Justin Ibarra 46d5e37b76 min_stack all rules to 8.3 (#2259)
* min_stack all rules to 8.3

* bump date

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
2022-08-24 10:38:49 -06:00

57 lines
1.7 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/07/02"
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2022/08/24"
integration = "aws"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies AWS IAM password recovery requests. An adversary may attempt to gain unauthorized AWS access by abusing
password recovery mechanisms.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be requesting changes in your environment.
Password reset attempts from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives,
it can be exempted from the rule.
""",
]
from = "now-60m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws*"]
interval = "10m"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AWS IAM Password Recovery Requested"
note = """## Setup
The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
references = ["https://www.cadosecurity.com/an-ongoing-aws-phishing-campaign/"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "69c420e8-6c9e-4d28-86c0-8a2be2d1e78c"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Elastic", "Cloud", "AWS", "Continuous Monitoring", "SecOps", "Identity and Access"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:signin.amazonaws.com and event.action:PasswordRecoveryRequested and event.outcome:success
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"