Justin Ibarra
46d5e37b76
* min_stack all rules to 8.3 * bump date Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
74 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
74 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/07/07"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/08/24"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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The hosts file on endpoints is used to control manual IP address to hostname resolutions. The hosts file is the first
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point of lookup for DNS hostname resolution so if adversaries can modify the endpoint hosts file, they can route traffic
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to malicious infrastructure. This rule detects modifications to the hosts file on Microsoft Windows, Linux (Ubuntu or
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RHEL) and macOS systems.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["auditbeat-*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Hosts File Modified"
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note = """## Setup
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For Windows systems using Auditbeat, this rule requires adding `C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc` as an additional path in the 'file_integrity' module of auditbeat.yml.
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = ["https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/auditbeat/current/auditbeat-reference-yml.html"]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "9c260313-c811-4ec8-ab89-8f6530e0246c"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Windows", "macOS", "Threat Detection", "Impact"]
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timeline_id = "4d4c0b59-ea83-483f-b8c1-8c360ee53c5c"
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timeline_title = "Comprehensive File Timeline"
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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any where
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/* file events for creation; file change events are not captured by some of the included sources for linux and so may
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miss this, which is the purpose of the process + command line args logic below */
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(
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event.category == "file" and event.type in ("change", "creation") and
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file.path : ("/private/etc/hosts", "/etc/hosts", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts")
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)
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or
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/* process events for change targeting linux only */
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(
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event.category == "process" and event.type in ("start") and
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process.name in ("nano", "vim", "vi", "emacs", "echo", "sed") and
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process.args : ("/etc/hosts")
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)
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1565"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/"
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name = "Data Manipulation"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1565.001"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001/"
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name = "Stored Data Manipulation"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0040"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
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name = "Impact"
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