Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/execution_via_hidden_shell_conhost.toml
T
Derek Ditch 580db2c13e Add timeline_id to detection rules (#95)
* Adds timeline_id to all network rules
- Uses the ID for the 'Generic Network Timeline' from Elastic
* Adds timeline_id to all endpoint rules
- Uses the ID for the 'Generic Endpoint Timeline' from Elastic
* Adds timeline_id to all process-oriented rules
    - Uses the ID for the 'Generic Process Timeline' from Elastic
* Ran tests and toml-lint
* Bumped 'updated_date'
2020-10-27 13:34:16 -05:00

48 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/08/17"
ecs_version = ["1.6.0"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2020/10/27"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by a suspicious parent process, which could be
indicative of code injection.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License"
name = "Conhost Spawned By Suspicious Parent Process"
references = [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-one.html",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "05b358de-aa6d-4f6c-89e6-78f74018b43b"
severity = "high"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
timeline_id = "76e52245-7519-4251-91ab-262fb1a1728c"
type = "query"
query = '''
event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and
process.name:conhost.exe and
process.parent.name:(svchost.exe or lsass.exe or services.exe or smss.exe or winlogon.exe or explorer.exe or dllhost.exe or rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe or userinit.exe or wininit.exe or spoolsv.exe or wermgr.exe or csrss.exe or ctfmon.exe)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"