Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/execution_from_unusual_path_cmdline.toml
T
Terrance DeJesus e8c39d19a7 [Rule Tuning] Missing MITRE ATT&CK Mappings (#2073)
* initial commit with eggshell mitre mapping added

* adding updated rules

* [Rule Tuning] MITRE for GCP rules

I've added Mitre references for the 4 GCP rules missing. Changed 3 of the rules from "Impact" to "Defense Evasion" based on the technique used and it's matched tactic.

* [Rule Tuning] Endgame Rule name updates for Mitre

Updated Endgame rule names for those with Mitre tactics to match the tactics.

* Update rules/integrations/aws/persistence_redshift_instance_creation.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* Update rules/integrations/aws/exfiltration_rds_snapshot_restored.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* adding 10 updated rules for google_workspace, ml and o365

* adding 22 rule updates for mitre att&ck mappings

* adding 24 rule updates related mainly to ML rules

* adding 3 rules related to detection via ML

* adding adjustments

* adding adjustments with solutions to recent pytest errors

* removed tabs from tags

* adjusted mappings and added techniques

* adjusted endgame rule mappings per review

* adjusted names to match different tactics

* added execution and defense evasion tag

* adjustments to address errors from merging with main

* added newlines to rules missing them at the end of the file

Co-authored-by: imays11 <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
2022-07-22 14:30:34 -04:00

152 lines
5.9 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/10/30"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2022/07/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies process execution from suspicious default Windows directories. This may be abused by adversaries to hide
malware in trusted paths.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Execution from Unusual Directory - Command Line"
note = """## Triage and analysis
This is related to the `Process Execution from an Unusual Directory rule`.
## Setup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "cff92c41-2225-4763-b4ce-6f71e5bda5e6"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution", "Defense Evasion"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
process.name : ("wscript.exe",
"cscript.exe",
"rundll32.exe",
"regsvr32.exe",
"cmstp.exe",
"RegAsm.exe",
"installutil.exe",
"mshta.exe",
"RegSvcs.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"pwsh.exe",
"cmd.exe") and
/* add suspicious execution paths here */
process.args : ("C:\\PerfLogs\\*",
"C:\\Users\\Public\\*",
"C:\\Users\\Default\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*",
"C:\\Intel\\*",
"C:\\AMD\\Temp\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\AppReadiness\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ServiceState\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\security\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\IdentityCRL\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Branding\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\csc\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\DigitalLocker\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\en-US\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\wlansvc\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Fonts\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\diagnostics\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\TAPI\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\INF\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\Speech\\*",
"C:\\windows\\tracing\\*",
"c:\\windows\\IME\\*",
"c:\\Windows\\Performance\\*",
"c:\\windows\\intel\\*",
"c:\\windows\\ms\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\dot3svc\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\panther\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\RemotePackages\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\OCR\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\appcompat\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\apppatch\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\addins\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Setup\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Help\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\SKB\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Vss\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Web\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\CbsTemp\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Logs\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\WaaS\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\twain_32\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ShellExperiences\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ShellComponents\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\PLA\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Migration\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\debug\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Containers\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Boot\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\bcastdvr\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\assembly\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\TextInput\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\security\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\schemas\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\SchCache\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Resources\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\rescache\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Provisioning\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\PrintDialog\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\PolicyDefinitions\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\media\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\Globalization\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\L2Schemas\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\LiveKernelReports\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ModemLogs\\*",
"C:\\Windows\\ImmersiveControlPanel\\*",
"C:\\$Recycle.Bin\\*") and
not process.parent.executable : ("C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*\\igfxCUIService*.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\spacedeskService.exe",
"C:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SupportAssistAgent\\SRE\\SRE.exe") and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.args : ("uxtheme.dll,#64", "PRINTUI.DLL,PrintUIEntry"))
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1036.005"
name = "Match Legitimate Name or Location"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"