Justin Ibarra
eeb8ab7744
* Expand timestamp_override tests
* removed timestamp_override from eql sequence rules
* add config entry for eql rules with beats index and t_o
* add timestamp_override to missing fields
Removed changes from:
- rules/cross-platform/impact_hosts_file_modified.toml
- rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_adding_the_hidden_file_attribute_with_via_attribexe.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_lolbas_wuauclt.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_suspicious_certutil_commands.toml
- rules/windows/execution_command_shell_started_by_svchost.toml
(selectively cherry picked from commit 6bdfddac8e)
60 lines
2.4 KiB
TOML
60 lines
2.4 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/02/18"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/03/31"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies suspicious child processes of Microsoft Outlook. These child processes are often associated with spear
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phishing activity.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious MS Outlook Child Process"
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note = """## Config
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "32f4675e-6c49-4ace-80f9-97c9259dca2e"
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Initial Access"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
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process.parent.name : "outlook.exe" and
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process.name : ("Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "arp.exe", "atbroker.exe", "bginfo.exe", "bitsadmin.exe",
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"cdb.exe", "certutil.exe", "cmd.exe", "cmstp.exe", "cscript.exe", "csi.exe", "dnx.exe", "dsget.exe",
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"dsquery.exe", "forfiles.exe", "fsi.exe", "ftp.exe", "gpresult.exe", "hostname.exe", "ieexec.exe",
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"iexpress.exe", "installutil.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "mshta.exe", "msxsl.exe", "nbtstat.exe", "net.exe",
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"net1.exe", "netsh.exe", "netstat.exe", "nltest.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "ping.exe", "powershell.exe",
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"pwsh.exe", "qprocess.exe", "quser.exe", "qwinsta.exe", "rcsi.exe", "reg.exe", "regasm.exe",
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"regsvcs.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "sc.exe", "schtasks.exe", "systeminfo.exe", "tasklist.exe",
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"tracert.exe", "whoami.exe", "wmic.exe", "wscript.exe", "xwizard.exe")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1566"
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name = "Phishing"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1566.001"
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name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0001"
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name = "Initial Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
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