Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/execution_ms_office_written_file.toml
T
Justin Ibarra 97ee8cc9ac Refresh beats and ecs schemas and default to use latest to validate (#570)
* Refresh beats and ecs schemas and default to use latest to validate
* remove incorrect ecs_version from zoom rule
* remove stale ecs_version from rules
2020-12-01 13:24:20 -09:00

62 lines
1.7 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/09/02"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2020/11/03"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies an executable created by a Microsoft Office application and subsequently executed. These processes are often
launched via scripts inside documents or during exploitation of MS Office applications.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "winlogbeat-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License"
name = "Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "0d8ad79f-9025-45d8-80c1-4f0cd3c5e8e5"
severity = "high"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Execution"]
type = "eql"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=2h
[file where event.type != "deletion" and file.extension : "exe" and
(process.name : "WINWORD.EXE" or
process.name : "EXCEL.EXE" or
process.name : "OUTLOOK.EXE" or
process.name : "POWERPNT.EXE" or
process.name : "eqnedt32.exe" or
process.name : "fltldr.exe" or
process.name : "MSPUB.EXE" or
process.name : "MSACCESS.EXE")
] by host.id, file.path
[process where event.type in ("start", "process_started")] by host.id, process.executable
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1064"
name = "Scripting"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1192"
name = "Spearphishing Link"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1193"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"