Jonhnathan
4233fef238
* win folder * Other folders * Update test_all_rules.py * . * updated missing elastic defend tags --------- Co-authored-by: terrancedejesus <terrance.dejesus@elastic.co>
117 lines
5.0 KiB
TOML
117 lines
5.0 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/10/20"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup, process.Ext.effective_parent.executable"
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min_stack_version = "8.4.0"
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updated_date = "2023/06/22"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries
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may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Process Created with an Elevated Token"
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references = [
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"https://lengjibo.github.io/token/",
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"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-createprocesswithtokenw",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "02a23ee7-c8f8-4701-b99d-e9038ce313cb"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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/* This rule is only compatible with Elastic Endpoint 8.4+ */
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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and
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/* CreateProcessWithToken and effective parent is a privileged MS native binary used as a target for token theft */
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user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
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/* Token Theft target process usually running as service are located in one of the following paths */
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process.Ext.effective_parent.executable :
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("?:\\Windows\\*.exe",
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"?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
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"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
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"?:\\ProgramData\\*") and
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/* Ignores Utility Manager in Windows running in debug mode */
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not (process.Ext.effective_parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and
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process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and process.parent.args : "/debug") and
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/* Ignores Windows print spooler service with correlation to Access Intelligent Form */
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not (process.parent.executable : "?\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe" and
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process.executable: "?:\\Program Files*\\Access\\Intelligent Form\\*\\LaunchCreate.exe") and
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/* Ignores Windows error reporting executables */
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not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
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"?:\\windows\\system32\\WerMgr.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.exe") and
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/* Ignores Windows updates from TiWorker.exe that runs with elevated privileges */
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not (process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*\\TiWorker.exe" and
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process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\iissetup.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\iissetup.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\aspnetca.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\aspnetca.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\lodctr.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\lodctr.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\netcfg.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\*\\ngen.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\*\\aspnet_regiis.exe")) and
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/* Ignores additional parent executables that run with elevated privileges */
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not process.parent.executable :
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("?:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
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"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
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"?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\*") and
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/* Ignores Windows binaries with a trusted signature and specific signature name */
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not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
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process.code_signature.subject_name :
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("philandro Software GmbH",
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"Freedom Scientific Inc.",
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"TeamViewer Germany GmbH",
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"Projector.is, Inc.",
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"TeamViewer GmbH",
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"Cisco WebEx LLC",
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"Dell Inc"))
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1134"
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name = "Access Token Manipulation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1134.002"
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name = "Create Process with Token"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0004"
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name = "Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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