shashank-elastic
71 lines
2.8 KiB
TOML
71 lines
2.8 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2021/07/06"
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integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/10/23"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Detects unusual Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) child processes. This may indicate an attempt to exploit privilege
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escalation vulnerabilities related to the Printing Service on Windows.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"""
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Install or update of a legitimate printing driver. Verify the printer driver file metadata such as manufacturer and
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signature information.
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""",
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]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Unusual Print Spooler Child Process"
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references = ["https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527"]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "ee5300a7-7e31-4a72-a258-250abb8b3aa1"
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setup = """
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
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events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
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Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
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`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
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For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
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"""
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Use Case: Vulnerability", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
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process.parent.name : "spoolsv.exe" and
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(?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or
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?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and
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/* exclusions for FP control below */
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not process.name : ("splwow64.exe", "PDFCreator.exe", "acrodist.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "msiexec.exe", "route.exe", "WerFault.exe") and
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not process.command_line : "*\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS*" and
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not (process.name : "net.exe" and process.command_line : ("*stop*", "*start*")) and
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not (process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and process.command_line : ("*.spl*", "*\\program files*", "*route add*")) and
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not (process.name : "netsh.exe" and process.command_line : ("*add portopening*", "*rule name*")) and
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not (process.name : "regsvr32.exe" and process.command_line : "*PrintConfig.dll*")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1068"
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name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0004"
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name = "Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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