Samirbous
5e801b2edf
* [Tuning] Improve Performance Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update : sequence not needed, removed auth event to improve rule execution time. Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry : removed sequence, since user.id is reported as std user SID (svchost is impersonating a remote user), and reduced file.path to known bad (based on observed TPs) * Update privilege_escalation_suspicious_dnshostname_update.toml * ++ * ++ --------- Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
67 lines
2.4 KiB
TOML
67 lines
2.4 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/05/11"
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integration = ["system", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/07/21"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies the remote update to a computer account's DnsHostName attribute. If the new value set is a valid domain
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controller DNS hostname and the subject computer name is not a domain controller, then it's highly likely a preparation
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step to exploit CVE-2022-26923 in an attempt to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to domain admin
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privileges.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update"
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references = [
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"https://research.ifcr.dk/certifried-active-directory-domain-privilege-escalation-cve-2022-26923-9e098fe298f4",
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"https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2022-26923",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "6bed021a-0afb-461c-acbe-ffdb9574d3f3"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring", "Data Source: Active Directory", "Use Case: Vulnerability"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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iam where event.action == "changed-computer-account" and user.id : ("S-1-5-21-*", "S-1-12-1-*") and
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/* if DnsHostName value equal a DC DNS hostname then it's highly suspicious */
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winlog.event_data.DnsHostName : "??*" and
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/* exclude FPs where DnsHostName starts with the ComputerName that was changed */
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not startswith~(winlog.event_data.DnsHostName, substring(winlog.event_data.TargetUserName, 0, length(winlog.event_data.TargetUserName) - 1))
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1068"
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name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1078"
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name = "Valid Accounts"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1078.002"
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name = "Domain Accounts"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0004"
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name = "Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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