Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_samaccountname_spoofing_attack.toml
T

85 lines
3.1 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2021/12/12"
integration = ["system", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/10/23"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a suspicious computer account name rename event, which may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2021-42278 to
elevate privileges from a standard domain user to a user with domain admin privileges. CVE-2021-42278 is a security
vulnerability that allows potential attackers to impersonate a domain controller via samAccountName attribute spoofing.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Privileged Escalation via SamAccountName Spoofing"
references = [
"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5008102-active-directory-security-accounts-manager-hardening-changes-cve-2021-42278-5975b463-4c95-45e1-831a-d120004e258e",
"https://cloudbrothers.info/en/exploit-kerberos-samaccountname-spoofing/",
"https://github.com/cube0x0/noPac",
"https://twitter.com/exploitph/status/1469157138928914432",
"https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "bdcf646b-08d4-492c-870a-6c04e3700034"
setup = """
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
"""
severity = "high"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation", "Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring", "Data Source: Active Directory", "Use Case: Vulnerability"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
iam where event.action == "renamed-user-account" and
/* machine account name renamed to user like account name */
winlog.event_data.OldTargetUserName : "*$" and not winlog.event_data.NewTargetUserName : "*$"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1068"
name = "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1078.002"
name = "Domain Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1098"
name = "Account Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"