e6df245ff3
* Create privilege_escalation_make_token_local.toml * Update privilege_escalation_make_token_local.toml * Update privilege_escalation_make_token_local.toml
74 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
74 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2023/12/04"
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integration = ["system", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/12/04"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies interactive logon attempt with alternate credentials and by an unusual process. Adversaries may
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create a new token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Interactive Logon by an Unusual Process"
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references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "61766ef9-48a5-4247-ad74-3349de7eb2ad"
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setup = """
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Audit event 4624 is needed to trigger this rule.
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
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events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
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Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
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`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
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For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
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"""
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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authentication where
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host.os.type : "windows" and winlog.event_data.LogonProcessName : "Advapi*" and
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winlog.logon.type == "Interactive" and winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
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winlog.event_data.TargetUserSid : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
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not startswith~(winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid, winlog.event_data.TargetUserSid) and
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not process.executable :
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("?:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe",
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"?:\\Program Files\\Okta\\Okta Verify\\OktaVerify.exe",
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"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Okta\\Okta Verify\\OktaVerify.exe")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1134"
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name = "Access Token Manipulation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1134.002"
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name = "Create Process with Token"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1134.003"
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name = "Make and Impersonate Token"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0004"
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name = "Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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