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sigma-rules/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_make_token_local.toml
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Samirbous e6df245ff3 [New] Interactive Logon by an Unusual Process (#3299)
* Create privilege_escalation_make_token_local.toml

* Update privilege_escalation_make_token_local.toml

* Update privilege_escalation_make_token_local.toml
2023-12-05 17:34:10 +00:00

74 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/12/04"
integration = ["system", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/12/04"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies interactive logon attempt with alternate credentials and by an unusual process. Adversaries may
create a new token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Interactive Logon by an Unusual Process"
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "61766ef9-48a5-4247-ad74-3349de7eb2ad"
setup = """
Audit event 4624 is needed to trigger this rule.
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
"""
severity = "high"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
authentication where
host.os.type : "windows" and winlog.event_data.LogonProcessName : "Advapi*" and
winlog.logon.type == "Interactive" and winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
winlog.event_data.TargetUserSid : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
not startswith~(winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid, winlog.event_data.TargetUserSid) and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Okta\\Okta Verify\\OktaVerify.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Okta\\Okta Verify\\OktaVerify.exe")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1134"
name = "Access Token Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1134.002"
name = "Create Process with Token"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1134.003"
name = "Make and Impersonate Token"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"