54 lines
1.8 KiB
TOML
54 lines
1.8 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2023/02/02"
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integration = ["windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "Related integrations field type changes in 8.8.0"
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min_stack_version = "8.8.0"
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updated_date = "2023/10/03"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Detects the creation of a WMI Event Subscription. Attackers can abuse this mechanism for persistence or to elevate to
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SYSTEM privileges.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious WMI Event Subscription Created"
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references = [
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"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf",
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"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "e72f87d0-a70e-4f8d-8443-a6407bc34643"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Data Source: Sysmon Only"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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any where event.dataset == "windows.sysmon_operational" and event.code == "21" and
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winlog.event_data.Operation : "Created" and winlog.event_data.Consumer : ("*subscription:CommandLineEventConsumer*", "*subscription:ActiveScriptEventConsumer*")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1546"
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name = "Event Triggered Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1546.003"
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name = "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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