shashank-elastic
126 lines
3.4 KiB
TOML
126 lines
3.4 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
|
|
creation_date = "2021/01/19"
|
|
integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
|
|
maturity = "production"
|
|
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
|
|
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
|
|
updated_date = "2023/10/23"
|
|
|
|
[rule]
|
|
author = ["Elastic"]
|
|
description = """
|
|
Identifies native Windows host and network enumeration commands spawned by the Windows Management Instrumentation
|
|
Provider Service (WMIPrvSE).
|
|
"""
|
|
from = "now-9m"
|
|
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
|
|
language = "eql"
|
|
license = "Elastic License v2"
|
|
name = "Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE"
|
|
risk_score = 21
|
|
rule_id = "770e0c4d-b998-41e5-a62e-c7901fd7f470"
|
|
setup = """
|
|
|
|
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
|
|
events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
|
|
Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
|
|
`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
|
|
For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
|
|
"""
|
|
severity = "low"
|
|
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint",
|
|
"OS: Windows",
|
|
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
|
|
"Tactic: Execution",
|
|
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
|
|
"Data Source: Elastic Defend"
|
|
]
|
|
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
|
|
type = "eql"
|
|
|
|
query = '''
|
|
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
|
|
process.name:
|
|
(
|
|
"arp.exe",
|
|
"dsquery.exe",
|
|
"dsget.exe",
|
|
"gpresult.exe",
|
|
"hostname.exe",
|
|
"ipconfig.exe",
|
|
"nbtstat.exe",
|
|
"net.exe",
|
|
"net1.exe",
|
|
"netsh.exe",
|
|
"netstat.exe",
|
|
"nltest.exe",
|
|
"ping.exe",
|
|
"qprocess.exe",
|
|
"quser.exe",
|
|
"qwinsta.exe",
|
|
"reg.exe",
|
|
"sc.exe",
|
|
"systeminfo.exe",
|
|
"tasklist.exe",
|
|
"tracert.exe",
|
|
"whoami.exe"
|
|
) and
|
|
process.parent.name:"wmiprvse.exe" and
|
|
not (
|
|
process.name : "sc.exe" and process.args : "RemoteRegistry" and process.args : "start=" and
|
|
process.args : ("demand", "disabled")
|
|
) and
|
|
not process.args : "tenable_mw_scan"
|
|
'''
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat]]
|
|
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1047"
|
|
name = "Windows Management Instrumentation"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/"
|
|
|
|
[rule.threat.tactic]
|
|
id = "TA0002"
|
|
name = "Execution"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat]]
|
|
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1018"
|
|
name = "Remote System Discovery"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/"
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1087"
|
|
name = "Account Discovery"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/"
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1518"
|
|
name = "Software Discovery"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/"
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1016"
|
|
name = "System Network Configuration Discovery"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/"
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
|
|
id = "T1016.001"
|
|
name = "Internet Connection Discovery"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001/"
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1057"
|
|
name = "Process Discovery"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/"
|
|
|
|
[rule.threat.tactic]
|
|
id = "TA0007"
|
|
name = "Discovery"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
|