Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_wsl_bash_exec.toml
T
2024-01-07 09:49:33 -03:00

81 lines
2.8 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/01/13"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2023/12/21"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects Linux Bash commands from the the Windows Subsystem for Linux. Adversaries may enable
and use WSL for Linux to avoid detection.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Execution via Windows Subsystem for Linux"
references = [
"https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-windows-subsystem-for-linux/",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Wsl/",
"https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/03/22/implications-of-windows-subsystem-for-linux-for-adversaries-defenders-part-1"
]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "3e0eeb75-16e8-4f2f-9826-62461ca128b7"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Execution", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type : "start" and
(
(
(process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\bash.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "Bash.exe") and
not process.command_line : ("bash", "bash.exe")
) or
process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Packages\\*\\rootfs\\usr\\bin\\bash" or
(
process.parent.name : "wsl.exe" and process.parent.command_line : "bash*" and not process.name : "wslhost.exe"
) or
(
process.name : "wsl.exe" and process.args : (
"curl", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd", "cat", "--system", "root", "-e", "--exec", "bash", "/mnt/c/*"
) and not process.args : ("wsl-bootstrap", "docker-desktop-data", "*.vscode-server*")
)
) and
not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\Docker\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Docker\\*.exe")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1202"
name = "Indirect Command Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"