Jonhnathan
6f4c323929
* [Rule Tuning] Windows DR Tuning - 6 * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_as_elastic_endpoint_process.toml * Update defense_evasion_network_connection_from_windows_binary.toml --------- Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
83 lines
2.6 KiB
TOML
83 lines
2.6 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/08/24"
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integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/12/11"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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A suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate a process hollowing or other form of code
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injection.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious Endpoint Security Parent Process"
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "b41a13c6-ba45-4bab-a534-df53d0cfed6a"
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setup = """
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
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events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
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Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
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`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
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For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
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"""
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
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process.name : ("esensor.exe", "elastic-endpoint.exe") and
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process.parent.executable != null and
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/* add FPs here */
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not process.parent.executable : (
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"?:\\Program Files\\Elastic\\*",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault*.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe"
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) and
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not (
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process.parent.executable : (
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\SecurityHealthHost.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe"
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) and
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process.args : (
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"test", "version",
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"top", "run",
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"*help", "status",
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"upgrade", "/launch",
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"/enable"
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)
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)
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1036"
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name = "Masquerading"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1036.005"
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name = "Match Legitimate Name or Location"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0005"
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name = "Defense Evasion"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
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