Jonhnathan
b4c84e8a40
* Update Tags * Bump updated date separately to be easy to revert if needed * Update resource_development_ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml * Apply changes from the discussion * Update persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml * Update defense_evasion_timestomp_sysmon.toml * Update defense_evasion_application_removed_from_blocklist_in_google_workspace.toml * Update missing Tactic tags * Update unit tests to match new tags * Add missing IG tags * Delete okta_threat_detected_by_okta_threatinsight.toml * Update command_and_control_google_drive_malicious_file_download.toml * Update persistence_rc_script_creation.toml * Mass bump * Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml * . --------- Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
80 lines
3.0 KiB
TOML
80 lines
3.0 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/07/05"
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integration = ["kubernetes"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added to Kubernetes Integration"
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min_stack_version = "8.4.0"
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updated_date = "2023/06/22"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This rule detects when a user creates a pod/container running in privileged mode. A highly privileged container has
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access to the node's resources and breaks the isolation between containers. If compromised, an attacker can use the
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privileged container to gain access to the underlying host. Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with
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the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the
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environment, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"""
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By default a container is not allowed to access any devices on the host, but a "privileged" container is given
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access to all devices on the host. This allows the container nearly all the same access as processes running on the
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host. An administrator may want to run a privileged container to use operating system administrative capabilities
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such as manipulating the network stack or accessing hardware devices from within the cluster. Add exceptions for
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trusted container images using the query field "kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.container.image"
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""",
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]
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index = ["logs-kubernetes.*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Kubernetes Privileged Pod Created"
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note = """## Setup
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The Kubernetes Fleet integration with Audit Logs enabled or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
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references = [
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"https://media.defense.gov/2021/Aug/03/2002820425/-1/-1/1/CTR_KUBERNETES%20HARDENING%20GUIDANCE.PDF",
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"https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "c7908cac-337a-4f38-b50d-5eeb78bdb531"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Data Source: Kubernetes", "Tactic: Execution", "Tactic: Privilege Escalation"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "query"
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query = '''
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event.dataset : "kubernetes.audit_logs"
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and kubernetes.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision:"allow"
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and kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource:pods
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and kubernetes.audit.verb:create
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and kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.containers.securityContext.privileged:true
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and not kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.containers.image: ("docker.elastic.co/beats/elastic-agent:8.4.0")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1611"
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name = "Escape to Host"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0004"
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name = "Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1610"
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name = "Deploy Container"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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