b4c84e8a40
* Update Tags * Bump updated date separately to be easy to revert if needed * Update resource_development_ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml * Apply changes from the discussion * Update persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml * Update defense_evasion_timestomp_sysmon.toml * Update defense_evasion_application_removed_from_blocklist_in_google_workspace.toml * Update missing Tactic tags * Update unit tests to match new tags * Add missing IG tags * Delete okta_threat_detected_by_okta_threatinsight.toml * Update command_and_control_google_drive_malicious_file_download.toml * Update persistence_rc_script_creation.toml * Mass bump * Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml * . --------- Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
46 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
46 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/11/16"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2023/06/22"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This rule uses alert data to determine when multiple different alerts involving the same user are triggered. Analysts
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can use this to prioritize triage and response, as these users are more likely to be compromised.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"""
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False positives can occur with Generic built-in accounts, such as Administrator, admin, etc. if they are widespread
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used in your environment. As a best practice, they shouldn't be used in day-to-day tasks, as it prevents the ability
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to quickly identify and contact the account owner to find out if an alert is a planned activity, regular business
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activity, or an upcoming incident.
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""",
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]
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from = "now-24h"
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interval = "1h"
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index = [".alerts-security.*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Multiple Alerts Involving a User"
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "0d160033-fab7-4e72-85a3-3a9d80c8bff7"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Use Case: Threat Detection", "Rule Type: Higher-Order Rule"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "threshold"
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query = '''
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signal.rule.name:* and user.name:* and not user.id:("S-1-5-18" or "S-1-5-19" or "S-1-5-20")
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'''
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[rule.threshold]
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field = ["user.name"]
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value = 1
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[[rule.threshold.cardinality]]
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field = "signal.rule.rule_id"
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value = 5
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