Jonhnathan
0273d118a6
* Update impact_deleting_backup_catalogs_with_wbadmin.toml * Update impact_deleting_backup_catalogs_with_wbadmin.toml * 1/2 * bump updated_date * 2/3 * Finale * Update persistence_evasion_registry_ifeo_injection.toml * . * Multiple fixes * Missing index * Missing AND
90 lines
3.7 KiB
TOML
90 lines
3.7 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/02/18"
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integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/03/06"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence
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on a system or domain.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "User Account Creation"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating User Account Creation
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Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.
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This rule identifies the usage of `net.exe` to create new accounts.
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#### Possible investigation steps
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- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
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- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
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- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
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- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
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### False positive analysis
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- Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
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### Related rules
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- Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e
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- Windows User Account Creation - 38e17753-f581-4644-84da-0d60a8318694
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### Response and remediation
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- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
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- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
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- Delete the created account.
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- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
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- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
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- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
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## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "1aa9181a-492b-4c01-8b16-fa0735786b2b"
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Persistence", "Investigation Guide", "Elastic Endgame"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
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process.name : ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and
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not process.parent.name : "net.exe" and
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(process.args : "user" and process.args : ("/ad", "/add"))
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1136"
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name = "Create Account"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1136.001"
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name = "Local Account"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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