Jonhnathan
0273d118a6
* Update impact_deleting_backup_catalogs_with_wbadmin.toml * Update impact_deleting_backup_catalogs_with_wbadmin.toml * 1/2 * bump updated_date * 2/3 * Finale * Update persistence_evasion_registry_ifeo_injection.toml * . * Multiple fixes * Missing index * Missing AND
63 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
63 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/07/16"
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integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/03/06"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe, the process responsible for Windows DNS Server services, which
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may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Unusual File Modification by dns.exe"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Unusual File Write
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Detection alerts from this rule indicate potential unusual/abnormal file writes from the DNS Server service process (`dns.exe`) after exploitation from CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed) has occurred. Here are some possible avenues of investigation:
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- Post-exploitation, adversaries may write additional files or payloads to the system as additional discovery/exploitation/persistence mechanisms.
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- Any suspicious or abnormal files written from `dns.exe` should be reviewed and investigated with care.
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## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/",
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"https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/07/14/july-2020-security-update-cve-2020-1350-vulnerability-in-windows-domain-name-system-dns-server/",
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"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detection-rules-for-sigred-vulnerability",
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "c7ce36c0-32ff-4f9a-bfc2-dcb242bf99f9"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Initial Access", "Elastic Endgame"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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file where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : "dns.exe" and event.type in ("creation", "deletion", "change") and
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not file.name : "dns.log" and not
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(file.extension : ("old", "temp", "bak", "dns", "arpa") and file.path : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\dns\\*")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1133"
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name = "External Remote Services"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0001"
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name = "Initial Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
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