Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/credential_access_copy_ntds_sam_volshadowcp_cmdline.toml
T
Justin Ibarra 59da2da474 [Rule Tuning] Ensure host information is in endpoint rule queries (#2593)
* add unit tests to ensure host type and platform are included
* add host.os.name 'linux' to all linux rules
* add host.os.name macos to mac rules
* add host.os.name to windows rules; fix linux dates
* update from host.os.name to host.os.type

Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-03-05 11:41:19 -07:00

67 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/11/24"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/02/22"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
description = """
Identifies a copy operation of the Active Directory Domain Database (ntds.dit) or Security Account Manager (SAM) files.
Those files contain sensitive information including hashed domain and/or local credentials.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
max_signals = 33
name = "NTDS or SAM Database File Copied"
note = """## Setup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
references = [
"https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy",
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "3bc6deaa-fbd4-433a-ae21-3e892f95624f"
severity = "high"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Credential Access", "Elastic Endgame"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
(
(process.pe.original_file_name in ("Cmd.Exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "XCOPY.EXE") and
process.args : ("copy", "xcopy", "Copy-Item", "move", "cp", "mv")
) or
(process.pe.original_file_name : "esentutl.exe" and process.args : ("*/y*", "*/vss*", "*/d*"))
) and
process.args : ("*\\ntds.dit", "*\\config\\SAM", "\\*\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*\\*", "*/system32/config/SAM*")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.002"
name = "Security Account Manager"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"