Justin Ibarra
59da2da474
* add unit tests to ensure host type and platform are included * add host.os.name 'linux' to all linux rules * add host.os.name macos to mac rules * add host.os.name to windows rules; fix linux dates * update from host.os.name to host.os.type Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
72 lines
2.1 KiB
TOML
72 lines
2.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/11/03"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/02/22"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies the deletion of sensitive Linux system logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy
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forensic evidence on a system.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "System Log File Deletion"
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note = """## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/11/live-off-the-land-an-overview-of-unc1945.html",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "aa895aea-b69c-4411-b110-8d7599634b30"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Defense Evasion", "Elastic Endgame"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "deletion" and
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file.path :
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(
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"/var/run/utmp",
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"/var/log/wtmp",
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"/var/log/btmp",
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"/var/log/lastlog",
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"/var/log/faillog",
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"/var/log/syslog",
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"/var/log/messages",
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"/var/log/secure",
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"/var/log/auth.log",
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"/var/log/boot.log",
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"/var/log/kern.log"
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) and
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not process.name : ("gzip")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1070"
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name = "Indicator Removal"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1070.002"
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name = "Clear Linux or Mac System Logs"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0005"
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name = "Defense Evasion"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
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