Terrance DeJesus
4312d8c958
* initial commit * addressing flake errors * added apm to _get_packagted_integrations logic * addressed flake errors * adjusted integration schema and updated rules to be a list * updated several rules and removed a unit test * updated rules with logs-* only index patterns * Update tests/test_all_rules.py Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> * addressed flake errors * integration is none is windows, endpoint or apm * adding rules with accepted incoming changes from main * fixed tag and tactic alignment errors from unit testing * adjusted unit testing logic for integration tags; added more exclusion rules * adjusted test_integration logic to be rule resistent and skip if -8.3 * adjusted comments for unit test skip * fixed merge conflicts from main * changing test_integration_tag to remove logic for rule version comparisons * added integration tag to new rule * adjusted rules updated_date value * ignore guided onboarding rule in unit tests * added integration tag to new rule Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
72 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
72 lines
2.5 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
|
|
creation_date = "2020/08/18"
|
|
integration = ["azure"]
|
|
maturity = "production"
|
|
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
|
|
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
|
|
updated_date = "2022/12/14"
|
|
|
|
[rule]
|
|
author = ["Elastic"]
|
|
description = """
|
|
Identifies when an Event Hub Authorization Rule is created or updated in Azure. An authorization rule is associated with
|
|
specific rights, and carries a pair of cryptographic keys. When you create an Event Hubs namespace, a policy rule named
|
|
RootManageSharedAccessKey is created for the namespace. This has manage permissions for the entire namespace and it's
|
|
recommended that you treat this rule like an administrative root account and don't use it in your application.
|
|
"""
|
|
false_positives = [
|
|
"""
|
|
Authorization rule additions or modifications may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the
|
|
username, hostname, and/or resource name should be making changes in your environment. Authorization rule additions
|
|
or modifications from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false
|
|
positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
|
|
""",
|
|
]
|
|
from = "now-25m"
|
|
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-azure*"]
|
|
language = "kuery"
|
|
license = "Elastic License v2"
|
|
name = "Azure Event Hub Authorization Rule Created or Updated"
|
|
note = """## Setup
|
|
|
|
The Azure Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
|
|
references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/event-hubs/authorize-access-shared-access-signature"]
|
|
risk_score = 47
|
|
rule_id = "b6dce542-2b75-4ffb-b7d6-38787298ba9d"
|
|
severity = "medium"
|
|
tags = ["Elastic", "Cloud", "Azure", "Continuous Monitoring", "SecOps", "Log Auditing"]
|
|
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
|
|
type = "query"
|
|
|
|
query = '''
|
|
event.dataset:azure.activitylogs and azure.activitylogs.operation_name:"MICROSOFT.EVENTHUB/NAMESPACES/AUTHORIZATIONRULES/WRITE" and event.outcome:(Success or success)
|
|
'''
|
|
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat]]
|
|
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1530"
|
|
name = "Data from Cloud Storage"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/"
|
|
|
|
|
|
[rule.threat.tactic]
|
|
id = "TA0009"
|
|
name = "Collection"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/"
|
|
|
|
[[rule.threat]]
|
|
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
|
|
[[rule.threat.technique]]
|
|
id = "T1537"
|
|
name = "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/"
|
|
|
|
|
|
[rule.threat.tactic]
|
|
id = "TA0010"
|
|
name = "Exfiltration"
|
|
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"
|
|
|