Jonhnathan
f02ffbbe13
* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 8.5 * Update persistence_run_key_and_startup_broad.toml * Apply suggestions from security-docs review review * Update execution_suspicious_jar_child_process.toml * Apply suggestions from review
139 lines
7.1 KiB
TOML
139 lines
7.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/11/16"
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2022/09/20"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies remote execution of Windows services over remote procedure call (RPC). This could be indicative of lateral
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movement, but will be noisy if commonly done by administrators."
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Remotely Started Services via RPC"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Remotely Started Services via RPC
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The Service Control Manager Remote Protocol is a client/server protocol used for configuring and controlling service
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programs running on a remote computer. A remote service management session begins with the client initiating the
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connection request to the server. If the server grants the request, the connection is established. The client can then
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make multiple requests to modify, query the configuration, or start and stop services on the server by using the same
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session until the session is terminated.
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This rule detects the remote creation or start of a service by correlating a `services.exe` network connection and the
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spawn of a child process.
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#### Possible investigation steps
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- Review login events (e.g., 4624) in the alert timeframe to identify the account used to perform this action. Use the
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`source.address` field to help identify the source system.
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- Review network events from the source system using the source port identified on the alert and try to identify the
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program used to initiate the action.
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- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files
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for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
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- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications,
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and any spawned child processes.
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- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
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- Validate if the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate
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software installations.
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- Retrieve the process executable and determine if it is malicious:
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- Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
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- Observe and collect information about the following activities:
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- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
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- File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
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- Service creation and launch activities.
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- Scheduled task creation.
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- Use the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
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- Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
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### False positive analysis
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- Remote management software like SCCM may trigger this rule. If noisy on your environment, consider adding exceptions.
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### Response and remediation
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- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
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- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
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- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
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- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
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- Stop suspicious processes.
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- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
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- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that
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attackers could use to reinfect the system.
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- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
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- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are
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identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business
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systems, and web services.
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- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and
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malware components.
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- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
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- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the
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mean time to respond (MTTR).
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"""
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references = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-scmr/705b624a-13de-43cc-b8a2-99573da3635f"]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "aa9a274d-6b53-424d-ac5e-cb8ca4251650"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Lateral Movement"]
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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sequence with maxspan=1s
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[network where process.name : "services.exe" and
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network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and network.transport == "tcp" and
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source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152 and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1"
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] by host.id, process.entity_id
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[process where event.type == "start" and process.parent.name : "services.exe" and
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not (process.name : "svchost.exe" and process.args : "tiledatamodelsvc") and
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not (process.name : "msiexec.exe" and process.args : "/V") and
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not process.executable :
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("?:\\Windows\\ADCR_Agent\\adcrsvc.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\VSSVC.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\servicing\\TrustedInstaller.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
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"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
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"?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\PSEXESVC.EXE",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\sppsvc.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiApSrv.exe",
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"?:\\WINDOWS\\RemoteAuditService.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\VeeamVssSupport\\VeeamGuestHelper.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\VeeamLogShipper\\VeeamLogShipper.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\CAInvokerService.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\upfc.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\AdminArsenal\\PDQ*.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\vds.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\Veeam\\Backup\\VeeamDeploymentSvc.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\ProPatches\\Scheduler\\STSchedEx.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\certsrv.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\eset-remote-install-service.exe",
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"?:\\Pella Corporation\\Pella Order Management\\GPAutoSvc.exe",
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"?:\\Pella Corporation\\OSCToGPAutoService\\OSCToGPAutoSvc.exe",
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"?:\\Pella Corporation\\Pella Order Management\\GPAutoSvc.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\NwxExeSvc\\NwxExeSvc.exe",
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"?:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostex.exe")
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] by host.id, process.parent.entity_id
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1021"
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name = "Remote Services"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0008"
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name = "Lateral Movement"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
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