Jonhnathan
f5c992b6de
* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 2 - 8.5 * Update rules/windows/lateral_movement_execution_via_file_shares_sequence.toml * Merge branch 'main' into investigation_guides_8.5_2 * Revert "Merge branch 'main' into investigation_guides_8.5_2" This reverts commit fb3c3f0245301d49229534d8776478c32f6c190e. * Apply suggested changes from review * Update discovery_security_software_grep.toml * Apply suggestions from review * Apply suggestions from review
131 lines
4.9 KiB
TOML
131 lines
4.9 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/12/20"
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2022/09/20"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies the use of the grep command to discover known third-party macOS and Linux security tools, such as Antivirus
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or Host Firewall details.
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"""
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false_positives = ["Endpoint Security installers, updaters and post installation verification scripts."]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "auditbeat-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Security Software Discovery via Grep"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Security Software Discovery via Grep
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After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps.
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This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security
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software.
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This rule looks for the execution of the `grep` utility with arguments compatible to the enumeration of the security
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software installed on the host. Attackers can use this information to decide whether or not to infect a system, disable
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protections, use bypasses, etc.
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#### Possible investigation steps
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- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files
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for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
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- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
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- Investigate any abnormal account behavior, such as command executions, file creations or modifications, and network
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connections.
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- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, file modifications, and any
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spawned child processes.
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- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
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- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate
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software installations.
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### False positive analysis
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- Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify
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suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed.
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### Response and remediation
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- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
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- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
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- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are
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identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business
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systems, and web services.
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- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and
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malware components.
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- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector.
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- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the
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mean time to respond (MTTR).
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## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "870aecc0-cea4-4110-af3f-e02e9b373655"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "macOS", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Discovery"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type == "start" and
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process.name : "grep" and user.id != "0" and
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not process.parent.executable : "/Library/Application Support/*" and
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process.args :
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("Little Snitch*",
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"Avast*",
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"Avira*",
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"ESET*",
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"BlockBlock*",
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"360Sec*",
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"LuLu*",
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"KnockKnock*",
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"kav",
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"KIS",
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"RTProtectionDaemon*",
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"Malware*",
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"VShieldScanner*",
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"WebProtection*",
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"webinspectord*",
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"McAfee*",
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"isecespd*",
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"macmnsvc*",
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"masvc*",
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"kesl*",
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"avscan*",
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"guard*",
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"rtvscand*",
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"symcfgd*",
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"scmdaemon*",
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"symantec*",
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"sophos*",
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"osquery*",
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"elastic-endpoint*"
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) and
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not (process.args : "Avast" and process.args : "Passwords")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1518"
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name = "Software Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1518.001"
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name = "Security Software Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0007"
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name = "Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
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