Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/impact_modification_of_boot_config.toml
T
Justin Ibarra 6bdfddac8e Expand timestamp override tests (#1907)
* Expand timestamp_override tests
* removed timestamp_override from eql sequence rules
* add config entry for eql rules with beats index and t_o
* add timestamp_override to missing fields
2022-04-01 15:27:08 -08:00

49 lines
1.6 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/03/16"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2022/03/31"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies use of bcdedit.exe to delete boot configuration data. This tactic is sometimes used as by malware or an
attacker as a destructive technique.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Modification of Boot Configuration"
note = """## Config
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "69c251fb-a5d6-4035-b5ec-40438bd829ff"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Impact"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
(process.name : "bcdedit.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "bcdedit.exe") and
(process.args : "/set" and process.args : "bootstatuspolicy" and process.args : "ignoreallfailures") or
(process.args : "no" and process.args : "recoveryenabled")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1490"
name = "Inhibit System Recovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0040"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"