8a59b49fea
* PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities * PowerShell Keylogging Script * PowerShell MiniDump Script * Potential Process Injection via PowerShell * PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions * Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script * PowerShell PSReflect Script * Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object * Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition * Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com> * Adjust Posh desc * . * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com> * . * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> * Update privilege_escalation_group_policy_scheduled_task.toml * Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_group_policy_iniscript.toml Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
148 lines
4.8 KiB
TOML
148 lines
4.8 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2021/10/13"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/03/02"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This rule detects the use of discovery-related Windows API functions in PowerShell Scripts. Attackers can use these
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functions to perform various situational awareness related activities, like enumerating users, shares, sessions, domain
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trusts, groups, etc.
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"""
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false_positives = ["Legitimate PowerShell scripts that make use of these functions."]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions"
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note = """## Triage and analysis.
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### Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions
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PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This
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makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
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Attackers can use PowerShell to interact with the Win32 API to bypass command line based detections, using libraries
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like PSReflect or Get-ProcAddress Cmdlet.
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#### Possible investigation steps
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- Examine script content that triggered the detection.
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- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree).
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- Inspect any file or network events from the suspicious PowerShell host process instance.
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- Investigate other alerts related to the user/host in the last 48 hours.
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- Consider whether the user needs PowerShell to complete its tasks.
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- Check if the imported function was executed.
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### False positive analysis
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- Discovery activities themselves are not inherently malicious if occurring in isolation, as long as the script does not
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contain other capabilities, and there are no other alerts related to the user or host; such alerts can be dismissed.
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However, analysts should keep in mind that this is not a common way of getting information, making it suspicious.
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### Related rules
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- PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe
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### Response and remediation
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- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
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- Quarantine the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
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- Configure AppLocker or equivalent software to restrict access to PowerShell for regular users.
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## Config
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The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
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Steps to implement the logging policy with with Advanced Audit Configuration:
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```
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Computer Configuration >
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Administrative Templates >
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Windows PowerShell >
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Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
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```
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Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
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```
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reg add "hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
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```
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"""
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references = [
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"https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Empire/blob/9259e5106986847d2bb770c4289c0c0f1adf2344/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network/powerview.ps1#L21413",
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"https://github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0109_windows_powershell_script_block_log.md"
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "61ac3638-40a3-44b2-855a-985636ca985e"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Discovery"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "query"
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query = '''
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event.category:process and
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powershell.file.script_block_text : (
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NetShareEnum or
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NetWkstaUserEnum or
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NetSessionEnum or
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NetLocalGroupEnum or
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NetLocalGroupGetMembers or
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DsGetSiteName or
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DsEnumerateDomainTrusts or
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WTSEnumerateSessionsEx or
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WTSQuerySessionInformation or
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LsaGetLogonSessionData or
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QueryServiceObjectSecurity
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)
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1135"
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name = "Network Share Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1069"
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name = "Permission Groups Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1069.001"
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name = "Local Groups"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0007"
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name = "Discovery"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1059"
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name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1059.001"
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name = "PowerShell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1106"
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name = "Native API"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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